














We derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions in order for a ﬁnite number of binary
voting choices to be consistent with the hypothesis that voters have preferences that
admit concave utility representations. When the location of the voting alternatives is
known, we apply these conditions in order to derive simple, nontrivial testable restric-
tions on the location of voters’ ideal points, and in order to predict individual voting
behavior. If, on the other hand, the location of voting alternatives is unrestricted
then voting decisions impose no testable restrictions on the joint location of voter ideal
points, even if the space of alternatives is one dimensional. Furthermore, two dimen-
sions are always suﬃcient to represent or fold the voting records of any number of
voters while endowing all these voters with strictly concave preferences and arbitrary
ideal points. The analysis readily generalizes to choice situations over any ﬁnite sets
of alternatives.
1 Introduction
What can we learn about individual voter preferences on the basis of data consisting of
a ﬁnite number of binary choices? Estimates of voter ideal points are now routinely obtained
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1using such records of past voting decisions, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Heckman
and Snyder (1997). These estimators rely on parametric restrictions on probabilistic choice
models and impose symmetry on voters’ utility functions around their ideal point, i.e., they
require that voter disutility is measured by Euclidean distance from that ideal point. In this
paper we take a diﬀerent route, seeking testable restrictions on voter preferences assuming
deterministic choice and without such parametric restrictions.
We maintain a spatial framework so that voters are confronted with a ﬁnite number of
choices between two alternatives drawn from a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean policy space. We
derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions in order for such voting records to be consistent
with voter preferences that admit concave utility representations. While these conditions
ensure that the hypothesis that individual preferences are convex is testable using a ﬁnite
number of binary choices, we show that such data do not allow us to discriminate between the
hypotheses that voters have (strictly) concave versus quasi-concave utility representations.
On the other hand, if individual voting records are rationalizable in the above sense, then
we use these conditions in order to derive nontrivial testable restrictions on the location
of voters’ ideal points. We also use these rationalizability conditions in order to predict
individual voting behavior on new voting items.
The application of the derived necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the purposes of
ideal point estimation and vote prediction requires knowledge of the location of the voting
alternatives. In fact, we show that if the location of the voting alternatives is unknown and
unrestricted, as in prevalent ideal point estimation techniques from roll call data, then voting
decisions alone impose no testable restrictions whatsoever on the joint location of voter ideal
points, even if the space of alternatives is one dimensional. For any arbitrary set of ideal
points for the voters, and for any record of voting decisions by these voters, we can locate the
voting alternatives and ﬁnd strictly concave utility functions for all voters such that both (i)
voters have the prespeciﬁed ideal points, and (ii) the utility functions perfectly explain all
individual voting decisions. Furthermore, we show that two dimensions are always suﬃcient
in order to represent (or, if the original voting record lies in higher dimensional space, in
2order to ‘fold’) any voting records, while at the same time endowing voters with strictly
concave utility representations and arbitrary ideal points.
The present study is connected with a branch of the literature on the theory of
revealed preferences of the consumer pioneered by Sydney Afriat (1967), in that we seek to
make inferences about individual preferences from a ﬁnite number of choice observations.
Afriat provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions that must be met by a set of observations
of prices and quantity choices of commodities in order for these observations to be consistent
with individual maximization of a non-trivial monotone, concave, utility function and, at the
same time, constructed the required utility representation. Hal Varian (1982) built on this
approach to study the non-parametric estimation of demand. We pursue a similar approach
but, unlike the classical theory of demand, in our context we have no observations akin
to prices and, once the voting agenda is formed, there is no similar process of individual
maximization over a budget set containing an inﬁnite set of alternatives. While we focus
the analysis on the case of binary voting choices, as we discuss in section 6, the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions we derive are applicable to more general choice situations over any
ﬁnite budget sets.
A number of other studies analyze revealed preferences over nonstandard (although
not necessarily ﬁnite) budget sets, under concavity and/or monotonicity conditions on prefer-
ences, e.g., Matzkin (1991), Cox and Chavas (1993), and Forges and Minelli (2006). General
ﬁnite budget sets are assumed by Chambers and Echenique (2007), who consider testable im-
plications of supermodularity, assuming non-satiated preferences. The present study diﬀers
from the above and standard theory of the consumer, in that we do not require mono-
tonicity of preferences. Indeed, individual preferences in political environments are typically
assumed to be satiated, with voters that possess well deﬁned ideal points. Non-montonicities
(although not necessarily leading to satiation) may also arise naturally in economic models
of altruism, as recently studied by, e.g., Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2007). While we do
not assume it, we do not rule out monotonicity of preferences so that the present analysis is
applicable to economic as well as voting contexts. Indeed, by the generalization we discuss
3in Theorem 9, the analysis can be applied to the problem of the consumer facing a ﬁnite
budget set, as is the case in the presence of indivisibilities.
While we shed monotonicity assumptions, we do rely heavily on convexity restrictions
on preferences, so that the analysis is intimately related with the literature on the concav-
iﬁability of individual preferences. Yakar Kannai (1977) tackled this question for the case
of continuous preferences on inﬁnite convex sets. For our purposes, the relevant question
is concaviﬁability of preferences on ﬁnite sets, a question that has recently been taken up
by Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong (2004) and Kannai (2005), whose results provide a
departure point for the present study. Via an application of a Theorem of the alternative,
Richter and Wong derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a (strictly)
concave utility function that represents complete and transitive preferences over ﬁnite sets.
Kannai (2005) discusses various alternative conditions focusing on the construction of the
requisite utility function. In the present study we consider a range of possible utility repre-
sentations from strict concavity to mere quasi-concavity of the rationalizing utility function.
The conditions we derive diﬀer from those of Richter and Wong (2004) and Kannai (2005) in
that they are applicable to any irreﬂexive (typically incomplete) revealed preference relation
over a ﬁnite set of alternatives.
Besides the extensive literature on ideal point estimation using roll call voting records
which is reviewed in Kalandrakis (2006), a number of recent studies analyze the consistency
of voting choices with speciﬁc parametric utility representations for the voters. Bogomol-
naia and Laslier (2007) establish bounds on the number of policy dimensions of the policy
space that are suﬃcient in order to represent any voter preferences over a ﬁxed number of
alternatives in this space by Eucledian utlity functions. Degan and Merlo (2007) establish
conditions on observable choices over multiple elections in order to falsify the hypothesis that
voters with Eucledian preferences vote sincerely. Working in a discrete space of alternatives,
Schwartz (2007) shows that observed voting histories cannot refute in either direction the
hypothesis that a committee’s majority rule social preference over the ﬁnite number of voting
alternatives in the voting record is transitive (respectively, intransitive). He also provides a
4suﬃcient condition in order for the committee’s preference proﬁle over this ﬁnite set to have
(respectively, not to have) a single-peaked representation.
We now proceed to the analysis. In the next section, we develop notation and review
the question of rationalizability without convexity restrictions. In section 3 we consider the
rationalization of voting records by concave utility functions. In section 4 we analyze how or
whether the conditions derived in section 3 can be used for the non-parametric estimation
of voter ideal points. In section 5 we analyze the use of the voting record for the purposes of
prediction. We show how the analysis generalizes to multiple choice situations over a ﬁnite
number of alternatives in section 6. We conclude in section 7.
2 Rationalizable Voting
Consider a set of n voters N = {1,...,n} who are confronted with a ﬁnite number
of binary choices over m pairs of alternatives in Rd. We call each pairwise comparison a
voting item, and denote the set of voting items by M = {1,...,m}. Let zj,yj ∈ Rd, zj 6= yj,
j ∈ M, represent the pair of alternatives compared in the j-th voting item. The voting
record of voter i is given by the collection {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M where vi
j ∈ {yes,no}, represents
i’s decision on the j-th voting item. A decision vi
j = yes is a vote in favor of alternative yj
over alternative zj, and vice versa for a decision vi
j = no. We occasionally distinguish the
voting decisions of voter i from the entire voting record, in which case we write the former
as a vector vi ∈ {yes,no}
m.






We shall ﬁnd it useful to represent subsets of the voting alternatives, XM, that correspond
to alternatives that voter i voted for or against. Thus, for any subset M0 ⊆ M of the voting
items we let Ni





x ∈ XM0 : x = yj and v
i
j = no, or x = zj and v
i
j = yes, for some j ∈ M
0	
.
5We similarly deﬁne Y i






x ∈ XM0 : x = yj and v
i
j = yes, or x = zj and v
i
j = no, for some j ∈ M
0	
.
Before we continue, we recall deﬁnitions and notation that will be used extensively
in what follows. As usual, x i x0 reads “i weakly prefers x over x0,” x,x0 ∈ Rd, while i
and ∼i denote strict preference and indiﬀerence, respectively. For a ﬁnite set K ⊂ Rd, we
write C(K) to denote the convex hull of K. We denote the set of extreme points of K by
E(K), which is the set of all the elements of K that cannot be written as a strict convex
combination of alternatives in K. The set of extreme points of K, E(K), is nonempty and
coincides with the vertexes of C(K). We use |K| to indicate the cardinality of the set K,
and write the set diﬀerence between sets K and K0 as K \ K0.
Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M, a ﬁrst step in our analysis is to test whether
there exists a utility function such that every voting decision of voter i is consistent with
utility maximization of that function. A strong formulation of this test is given in the
following deﬁnition.









yes if ui(yj) > ui(zj)
no if ui(yj) < ui(zj)
, j ∈ M.
The above deﬁnition rules out the possibility of indiﬀerence between any pair of alternatives
in any voting item. This is not a particularly stringent requirement if voters have non-trivial
preferences over Rd and the voting alternatives in any particular voting item arise exoge-
nously according to some randomized process. Furthermore, it appears that by requiring any
vote to indicate strict preference, we maximize the information on voters’ preferences that
can be extracted from the voting record. On the other hand, voter indiﬀerence arises natu-
rally in many equilibrium models of voting when proposals are determined endogenously by
6a utility maximizing agenda setter. Thus, a more parsimonious interpretation of the voting
record leads to the following weaker criterion.









yes if ui(yj) ≥ ui(zj)
no if ui(yj) ≤ ui(zj)
, j ∈ M.
In accordance with the above deﬁnitions, we will say that a voting record is (strictly)
rationalizable, if there exists a utility function that (strictly) rationalizes that record. Well
known arguments imply that even the strongest of these two criteria places weak restrictions
on ﬁnite voting records.
Theorem 1 The voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i is
(i) rationalizable.





M0, for all non-empty M
0 ⊆ M.
Part (i) is trivial since a constant function rationalizes any voting record. To see
part (ii), note that condition (A) is in fact the familiar acyclicity condition. In particular,
(A) is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that there does not exist a set of voting items and
corresponding votes that produce a chain of comparisons between voting alternatives of the
form x i x0 i ... i x. If (A) holds, the choices in the voting record deﬁne a strict
partial order in XM, and we can extend this relation to a strict linear order (e.g., Lemma 2
in Richter (1966)). The construction of a (continuous) rationalizing utility function ui over
Rd is trivial. Condition (A) can be traced to general revealed preference analyses by Arrow
(1959), Richter (1966), etc., and it amounts to a ﬁnite version of Ville-Houthakker SARP
in the context of revealed preference theory of the consumer. Nevertheless, this condition
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Figure 1: Strict Rationalizability.
has signiﬁcantly less bite in the context of voting. For example, a suﬃcient condition on the
voting alternatives in order for condition (A) to be satisﬁed for all voting decisions is:
(N) For all M
0 ⊆ M, there exists j ∈ M
0 and x ∈ X{j} such that x / ∈ XM0\{j}.
Condition (N) simply requires that for each subset of voting items there exists a voting
alternative that appears in only one voting item in that subset. Figure 1 illustrates four
voting records in two dimensions, only one of which (Figure 1(a)) violates (N) and (A).
Thus, questions of rationalizability of voting choices become interesting only under additional
restrictions on voters’ preferences. We take up this analysis in the next section.
83 Concave Rationalizations
In this section we consider whether observed voting records are consistent with the
hypothesis that voters’ decisions are generated by convex preferences. We consider several
variants of this restriction, the strongest of which is the existence of a rationalizing utility
function, ui : Rd → R, that is strictly concave:
(3) ui(λx + (1 − λ)x
0) > λui(x) + (1 − λ)ui(x
0), for all x,x
0,x 6= x
0, and all λ ∈ (0,1).
A weaker restriction is strict quasiconcavity:
(4) ui(λx + (1 − λ)x
0) > min{ui(x),ui(x
0)}, for all x,x
0,x 6= x
0, and all λ ∈ (0,1).
When relevant, we also consider mere concavity and quasiconcavity, which are obtained
from (3) and (4), respectively, by allowing weak inequality. These restrictions have a natural
place in the theory of voting. For example, in a one-dimensional space (d = 1) strict
quasiconcavity of preferences boils down to the single-peakedness condition familiar from
social choice theory.
It turns out that when it comes to strict rationalizability, ﬁnite voting records do
not allow us to discriminate among these possible utility representations. Nevertheless, not
all voting records that are strictly rationalizable can be so rationalized by a (quasi)concave
utility function. In the next Theorem we state necessary and suﬃcient conditions.
9Theorem 2 Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i, the following conditions are
equivalent:
For all M
0 ⊆ M, |M
0| ≥ 2, there exists x ∈ E(XM0) such that x / ∈ Y
i
M0. (S)
There exists a nested sequence of subsets M = M1 ⊃ M2 ⊃ ... ⊃ Mk ⊃ Mk+1 = ∅, (S0)
k ≤ m, such that N
i
Mt\Mt+1 = {xt} ⊂ E(XMt) and xt / ∈ XMt+1, for all t = 1,...,k.
There exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record. (Sc)
There exists a concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record. (S0
c)
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s (Sq)
record.
There exists a quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record. (S0
q)
Furthermore, if d = 1, then (S) is equivalent to:
For all M
0 ⊆ M with |M
0| = 2, there exists x ∈ E(XM0) such that x / ∈ Y
i
M0. (S1)
Of course, condition (S) implies condition (A) but it is, in fact, a signiﬁcant strength-
ening of that condition. This is in contrast to standard neoclassical theory of the consumer
where a ﬁnite version of Ville-Houthakker acyclicity in the form of SARP are suﬃcient for
that consumer to have a (strictly) concave utility representation as shown by, e.g., Afriat
(1967), Matzkin and Richter (1991), etc. Besides the fact that we analyze choice situations
with non-standard, ﬁnite budget sets, a major diﬀerence in our analysis is the fact that
we seek utility representations for possibly satiated preferences, whereas the corresponding
analysis of the consumer requires monotonicity of preferences.
The necessity of condition (S) is straightforward. From a practical point of view,







subsets XM0 ⊆ XM, |M0| ≥ 2, of the voting alternatives. While this task
appears daunting as the number of voting items increases, the equivalent condition1 (S0) of
1Yet another equivalent statement of condition (S) that appeared in previous versions is
(S00) For all M0 ⊆ M, |M0| ≥ 2, there exists x ∈ Ni
M0 such that x / ∈ C(Y i
M0).
10Theorem 2 provides a palatable remedy: it suﬃces to identify such extreme points for at most
m subsets M0 ⊆ M. As explicitly determined in the proof of Theorem 2, we can construct
the sequence of these subsets required by (S0) successively shifting over the elements of Ni
M
as follows: we must ﬁrst identify the requisite extreme point, x1 ∈ Ni
M, from the universe of
voting alternatives XM; we then need to proceed ‘inwards’ and identify a new extreme point
x2 ∈ Ni
M with the required properties, by only considering the subset M2 of voting items,
i.e., ignoring voting alternatives involved in voting items such that x1 is voted against by
voter i, etc. For example, for the voting record in Figure 1(b), we have k = 5 < m = 6 and
the required sequence is M1 = {1,...,6} with the ﬁrst extreme point being x1 = z6, then
M2 = {1,2,3,4,5} with x2 = z5, M3 = {1,2,3,4} with x3 = z4, M4 = {1,2} with x4 = z2,
and ﬁnally M5 = {1} with x5 = z1.
A reversal of the order of the above algorithm yields an inductive proof of the suﬃ-
ciency of condition (S0). In particular, we can trivially ﬁnd a concave function that rational-
izes revealed preferences over alternatives XMk. We can then move ‘outwards’ to extend or
modify this function to represent revealed preferences over XMk−1 by preserving the existing
comparisons among alternatives in XMk and by assigning a suﬃciently lower indiﬀerence
contour to the extreme point xk−1. Proceeding as above, at the t-th step of the process
we can strictly rationalize revealed preferences over the larger set XMk−t+1 by assigning a
suﬃciently lower indiﬀerence contour to the extreme point xk−t+1, etc.
A diﬀerent simpliﬁcation of condition (S) obtains in the one-dimensional case (d = 1).
Then, condition (S) is equivalent to (S1) which only requires the existence of the requisite
extreme points for pairs of voting items. In one dimension there can exist at most two
extreme points, thus, if condition (S) fails for voter i and a subset M0 ⊆ M of three or more
voting items, then the condition must also fail for a pair of the voting items {j,h} ⊂ M0
such that Y i
{j,h} = E(Y i
M0). Intuition may suggest that an analogous weakening of condition
(S) is possible in more than one dimensions by requiring that this condition be applied only
to subsets comprising at most d + 1 voting items when d > 1. Unfortunately, this is not
11the case, as is illustrated in Figure 1(c) in a two-dimensional setting: while condition (S)
holds for all triplets (d + 1 = 3) of voting items, it fails when we consider all four items in
the voting record. In two or more dimensions there is no analogous bound on the number of
extreme points such as the one that obtains in one dimension.
It is useful to contrast the above conclusion and condition (S) of Theorem 2 with
the following (slightly restated) necessary and suﬃcient condition of Richter and Wong for
the existence of a strictly concave function (Richter and Wong (2004), Theorem 2) that
rationalizes a reﬂexive, transitive, and complete preference relation i over a ﬁnite set K:
For all X ⊆ K such that |X| ≤ d + 1 and E(X) = X, and for all x ∈ K such that (G0)
x is in the interior of C(X), there exists x
0 ∈ X such that x i x
0.
Note that, since (G0) is necessary and suﬃcient, if the strict preference relation, say v
i,
determined by the voting record can be extended to a total order on XM that admits a
strictly concave utility representation, then condition (G0) must hold for that extension. But
condition (G0) (or its counterpart condition (G) for mere concavity) applied to the incomplete
preference relation v
i deﬁned by the voting record is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the
existence of such a rationalizing extension. As Richter and Wong point out in their Remark
4, page 344, if v
i satisﬁes condition (G0) (or (G)) then this condition is suﬃcient, as long
as the voting record also satisﬁes (A). Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 1(d), where
(A) is satisﬁed and the fact that the voting record reveals that y2 v
i z2 ensures that (G0)
holds for any extension of v
i. But in typical situations condition (G0) does not hold on the
basis of the information directly or indirectly2 revealed by the voting record, as is the case
in Figures 1(b) and 1(c). Nevertheless, as we have already discussed, a rationalizing strictly
concave utility function does exist in the case of Figure 1(b), but not in the case of Figure
1(c).
Lastly, note that Theorem 2 establishes that if there exists a quasiconcave utility
function that strictly rationalizes a voting record, then there also exists a (strictly) concave
function that strictly rationalizes that voting record. In contrast, the equivalence between
2I.e., even if we consider the transitive closure of the directly revealed preferences, v
i.












Figure 2: Rationalizability and Admissible Cycles.
concave and quasiconcave rationalizations ((S0
c) and (S0
q)) does not obtain for general com-
plete preferences over ﬁnite sets. In particular, Richter and Wong (2004) provide an example
of preferences over a set K of three alternatives that admit a quasiconcave utility representa-
tion, yet do not admit a concave representation. That example, though, requires indiﬀerence
and such situations with indiﬀerence are ruled out when the available information is obtained
from binary voting indicating strict preference.
We now turn to the case when individual votes may indicate weak preference. Ob-
viously, condition (S) (or (S0)) of Theorem 2 is now suﬃcient for concave rationalizability
but it is not necessary. In fact, the gap between these two notions of rationalizability is
signiﬁcant when we merely require (quasi)concave rationalizing functions, since a constant
function rationalizes every voting record. But when it comes to rationalizability by strictly
(quasi)concave functions, Theorem 3 establishes a necessary and suﬃcient condition that
turns out to be only mildly weaker than the corresponding condition of Theorem 2. Further-
more, when this necessary and suﬃcient condition obtains, we can assign strict preferences
to all pairwise comparisons in the voting record except those that are entangled in an in-
dividual preference voting cycle, in accordance to the following intermediate criterion for
rationalizability.
Deﬁnition 3 A utility function ui : Rd → R virtually rationalizes the voting record
13{(xj,yj,vi
j)}j∈M if it rationalizes that record and, in addition, it strictly rationalizes the record
{(xj,yj,vi
j)}j∈Ma that comprises all voting items in the subset
(5) Ma = {j ∈ M : @M






When a voting record is virtually rationalized, indiﬀerence between any pair of alternatives
is imputed by the rationalizing function in a minimal way. As we show, we can virtually
rationalize a voting record by a strictly (quasi)concave utility function whenever we can
rationalize this record by such a function.
Theorem 3 Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i, the following conditions are
equivalent:
For all M
0 ⊆ M, |M
0| ≥ 2, there exists x ∈ E(XM0) such that x / ∈ Y
i
M0, or there (W)
exists non-empty M
00 ⊆ M










There exists a nested sequence of subsets M = M1 ⊃ ... ⊃ Mk ⊃ Mk+1 = ∅,k ≤ m, (W 0)
such that N
i
Mt\Mt+1 ⊆ E(XMt), either N
i











t ⊆ Mt \ Mt+1, and N
i
Mt\Mt+1 ∩ XMt+1 = ∅, for all t = 1,...,k.
There exists a strictly concave utility function that virtually rationalizes i’s record. (W 0
c)
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that virtually rationalizes i’s (W 0
q)
record.
There exists a strictly concave utility function that rationalizes i’s record. (Wc)
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that rationalizes i’s record. (Wq)
Furthermore, if d = 1, then (W) is equivalent to:
For all M
0 ⊆ M, |M








14The arguments that prove Theorem 3 are analogous to those we outlined for the proof
of Theorem 2.3 An inspection of conditions (W) and (W 0) reveals that the gap between strict
rationalizability and mere rationalizability is quite narrow under the requirement that the
rationalizing utility function is strictly (quasi)concave. In particular, voting records that
cannot be strictly rationalized but can be rationalized exhibit a particular type of violation
of acyclicity, (A). In order to rationalize voting records that violate (A), we must assign all
alternatives that are entangled in the revealed voting cycle to the same indiﬀerence contour.
While this is possible in the case of Figure 1(a), Figures 2(a) and 2(b) make it plain that not
all individual voter preference cycles can be rationalized by strictly (quasi) concave utility
functions. In the case of Figure 2(a) this is because the required indiﬀerence contour cannot
delineate a convex set, and in the case of Figure 2(b) because nested indiﬀerence contours
that rationalize cycles must be ranked in ascending order, and this is impossible for the
voting record depicted in that ﬁgure since we must have y7 i z7. Clearly, if violations of
acyclicity are ruled out, such as is the case when (N) holds, then conditions (S) and (W)
are equivalent.
Corollary 1 If the voting record {(xj,yj,vi
j)}j∈M satisﬁes (A), then (S) ⇔ (W).
Despite the fact that the two conditions are virtually identical (barring revelations of indi-
vidual voting cycles), in section 5 we shall show that the weaker premises of Theorem 3 yield
much stronger payoﬀs when it comes to using the voting record in order to predict voter i’s
voting decisions.
In this section we derived necessary and suﬃcient conditions that must be satisﬁed by
a voting record in order for it to be strictly rationalized by a (quasi)concave function, and we
have shown that these conditions are identical whether we require strict (quasi)concavity or
not. If we require the rationalizing utility function to be strictly quasiconcave, then mildly
weaker conditions are necessary and suﬃcient to (merely) rationalize a voting record. These
conclusions are summarized in Table 1.
3In fact, to avoid duplication of these arguments, we rely on the proof of Theorem 3 in the statement of
the proof of Theorem 2.
15ui is ui is ui is strictly
unrestricted (quasi)concave (quasi)concave
ui rationalizes i’s voting record ∅ ∅ (W)
ui strictly rationalizes i’s voting record (A) (S) (S)
Table 1: Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Rationalizability.
4 Ideal Points
If i’s voting record is (strictly) rationalizable, then voter i may have an ideal point,
i.e., there may exist an alternative ˆ x ∈ Rd such that i prefers ˆ x over all other alternatives.
In particular, the evidence from the voting record of i cannot refute the existence of such
an ideal point ˆ x whenever i’s voting record can be rationalized by a utility function that is
uniquely maximized at ˆ x:
Deﬁnition 4 A utility function ui : Rd → R rationalizes i’s voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M
with ideal point ˆ xi if (2) holds and
(6) ui(ˆ xi) > ui(x), for all x ∈ R
d,x 6= ˆ xi.
It strictly rationalizes i’s record with ideal point ˆ xi if both (1) and (6) hold.
Armed with the above criterion, we may then inquire whether i’s voting record places
any testable restrictions on the location of her ideal point? Obviously, this question has a
trivial answer if we do not impose any restrictions on i’s preferences: if we can rationalize i’s
voting record, then we can do so with any ideal point ˆ xi / ∈ Ni
M. On the other hand, under
convexity restrictions on preferences, the results of our investigation in the previous section
provide a more promising approach to the problem. In fact, as we will explain shortly, the
following Lemma reduces the question on the nature of testable restrictions on a voter’s ideal
point from her voting record to a question of rationalizability of an augmented voting record.
16Lemma 1 Consider a ﬁnite set K ⊂ Rd and strictly concave ui : Rd → R that represents
i’s preferences over K. If ˆ x ∈ K is such that ˆ x i x for all x ∈ K, x 6= ˆ x, then there exists
another strictly concave ˜ ui : Rd → R that represents i’s preferences over K \ {ˆ x} such that
˜ ui(ˆ x) > ˜ ui(x) for all x ∈ Rd, x 6= ˆ x.
Thus, if we can rationalize the preferences of a voter over a ﬁnite set with a strictly
concave function, and there exists an alternative ˆ x in that ﬁnite set that is (weakly) preferred
to every other alternative in that set, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that this voter has
a strictly concave utility function with ideal point ˆ x. As a consequence, Lemma 1 suggests
a straightforward test for the hypothesis that the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i
can be strictly rationalized by a strictly concave utility function with ideal point ˆ xi. We can
construct an augmented voting record that includes ˆ m = |XM \{ˆ xi}| additional voting items
of the form (ˆ xi,z,yes), for each of the alternatives z ∈ XM \ {ˆ xi}. Speciﬁcally,
Deﬁnition 5 Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M for voter i and alternative ˆ xi, the aug-
mented voting record of voter i, {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M, is such that ˆ M = {m + 1,...,m + ˆ m},
yj = ˆ xi, zj ∈ XM \ {ˆ xi}, and vi
j = yes for all j ∈ ˆ M, and Ni
ˆ M = XM \ {ˆ xi}.
By Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, there exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly
rationalizes i’s voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M with ideal point ˆ xi if and only if the augmented
voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (S). In Theorem 4 we state this necessary and
suﬃcient condition as (b S0) and show that, in fact, it is equivalent to the apparently weaker
condition (b S) of that Theorem.
17Theorem 4 Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i, and an alternative ˆ xi ∈ Rd, the
following conditions are equivalent:
For all M
0 ⊆ M,|M
0| ≥ 1, there exists x ∈ E(XM0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) such that (b S)
x / ∈ Y
i
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}.
The augmented voting record {(yj,zj,v
i
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (S) or (S
0). (b S0)
There exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record (b Sc)
with ideal point ˆ xi.
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s (b Sq)
record with ideal point ˆ xi.
There exists a concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record with ideal (b S0
c)
point ˆ xi.
There exists a quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i’s record with (b S0
q)
ideal point ˆ xi.
If d = 1, then (b S) is equivalent to:
For all M
0 ⊆ M, 1 ≤ |M
0| ≤ 2, there exists x ∈ E(XM0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) such that (b S1)
x / ∈ Y
i
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}.
Condition (b S), provides a precise set of testable restrictions on the location of voter
i’s ideal point arising from her voting record, assuming that i has a (strictly quasi)concave
utility function. Of course, condition (b S) implies condition (S). Furthermore, as is true for
Theorem 2, the one-dimensional case admits a further simpliﬁcation of condition (b S). We
provide a graphical illustration of the implications of Theorem 4 in Figure 3, where we depict
ﬁve voting alternatives associated with four voting items (m = 4) in a two-dimensional space.
Application of condition (b S) restricts voter i’s ideal point, ˆ xi, to lie outside the areas marked
gray in Figure 3(b).













Figure 3: Voter i cannot have a (strictly) (quasi)concave utility function with ideal point
that lies in the gray areas.
Because Lemma 1 allows the candidate ideal point to be weakly preferred over the
remaining alternatives in ﬁnite set K, virtually identical arguments lead to the following
Theorem when we consider mere rationalizability of the voting record.
Theorem 5 Given voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of voter i, and an alternative ˆ xi ∈ Rd, the
following conditions are equivalent:
For all non-empty M
0 ⊆ M there exists x ∈ E(XM0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) such that (c W)
x / ∈ Y
i









for some non-empty M
00 ⊆ M
0.
The augmented voting record {(yj,zj,v
i
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (W) or (W
0). (c W 0)
There exists a strictly concave utility function that (virtually) rationalizes i’s (c Wc)
record with ideal point ˆ xi.
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that (virtually) rationalizes i’s (c Wq)
record with ideal point ˆ xi.
19If d = 1, then (c W) is equivalent to:
For all M
0 ⊆ M, 1 ≤ |M
0| ≤ 2, there exists x ∈ E(X
i
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) such that (c W1)
x / ∈ Y
i






M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}).
Jointly, Theorems 4 and 5 establish that ﬁnite voting records impose nontrivial
testable restrictions on voters’ ideal points. Compared to existing parametric methods for
the estimation of voters’ ideal points, though, the non-parametric tests suggested by The-
orems 4 and 5 impose a signiﬁcant burden on the analyst, as they require the availability
of the voters’ entire voting record. On the contrary, most existing techniques rely only on
partial information on the voting record that typically reduces to mere knowledge of voters’
vector of voting decisions.4 Thus, it is important to ask whether the testable restrictions
on ideal points we have derived so far have any bearing if we relax the assumption that the
location of the voting alternatives zj, yj is known. We devote the rest of this section to this
question.
First, we show that the conditions of Theorem 4 and 5 are vacuously met for all voters
and for every number of issue dimensions d ≥ 1, if the location of the voting alternatives is
unrestricted. Speciﬁcally, we show:
Theorem 6 Consider any voting decisions (v1,...,vn) ∈ {yes,no}nm. For every d ≥ 1
and every n-tuple of points ˆ x1,..., ˆ xn ∈ Rd, there exist voting alternatives zj, yj ∈ Rd,
j = 1,...,m, and n strictly concave utility functions ui, each with ideal point ˆ xi, such that
for every voter i ui strictly rationalizes the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M.
Note that Theorem 6 states that all possible voting decisions and all possible ideal
points for the n voters can all be rationalized by appropriately choosing the location of
the voting alternatives. That is, one choice of the location of the voting alternatives works
4It does not follow that additional information cannot be acquired. Financial legislation disbursing funds
in diﬀerent policy areas readily supplies such information. If we embed the voting in the committee within
a larger process in which proposals emerge endogenously, then such information may arise structurally from
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An example of the construction in the proof of Theorem 6 for n = 3 voters, m = 5 voting 
items, and ideal points that satisfy x ˆ 1 < x ˆ 2 < x ˆ 3. The voting decisions are given by v j
1 = yes 
for all j = 1,…, 5, for voter 1,  v1
2 = v3
2 = v4
2 = no and v2
2 = v5




3 = no and v1
3 = v2
3 = yes, for voter 3.  
Figure 4: Illustration of Theorem 6.
for all voters at the same time. Obviously, Theorem 6 is valid a fortiori if we impose
weaker requirements on voters’ utility functions, for instance, if we relax strict concavity
to quasiconcavity. In the one-dimensional case, Theorem 6 is shown by construction. An
illustration is provided in Figure 4. In essence, the result stems from the fact that there
exists a way to arrange the voting alternatives zj, yj, such that all voting records necessarily
satisfy condition (S1) of Theorem 2, for any voting decisions. This arrangement amounts to
locating one of the two voting alternatives in each voting item in some arbitrary order, then
locating the remaining voting alternatives in a non-overlapping interval, in the reverse order
of voting items. It is then a simple additional step to translate the above arrangement in
the space of alternatives where the given ideal points have already been located in order to
ensure that the added restrictions of condition (b S1) of Theorem 4 are not violated. In the
generic case when voters’ ideal points are distinct, this construction can be achieved while at
the same time ensuring that at least one of the voting alternatives zj,yj, lies in the Pareto
set for each voting item j ∈ M.
21Theorem 6 forecloses any possibility for the nonparametric estimation of agnostic
(Londregan (2000)) models of legislator ideal points, i.e., models that assume no information
on the location of the voting alternatives. Barring knowledge of the voting alternatives,
non-parametric estimation of voter preferences requires at least some restrictions on their
location for identiﬁcation purposes. One such extra identiﬁcation restriction in the context
of a parametric probabilistic voting model is used by Clinton and Meirowitz (2001) who
require that the victorious voting alternative from voting item j become the status quo voting
alternative in voting item j+1. If we impose this extra condition, then it is easy to see using
condition (S1) of Theorem 2 that the conclusion of Theorem 6 no longer obtains.5 There
exist voting records that cannot be strictly rationalized for all voters, opening the possibility
for the non-parametric estimation of the one-dimensional probabilistic voting model. Yet, as
the following Theorem shows, the identifying role of this additional restriction, while possibly
strong in one dimension, has no bite in higher dimensions.
Theorem 7 (Folding) Consider a space of voting alternatives of any dimension d ≥ 1,
any voting alternatives zj, yj ∈ Rd, j ∈ M, and any voting decisions vi ∈ {yes,no}m for the
n voters. For every d0 ≥ 2, and for every n-tuple of points ˆ x1,..., ˆ xn ∈ Rd0, there exists a
one-to-one function f : XM → Rd0 such that for every voter i:
(i) there exists a strictly concave utility function ui : Rd0 → R with ideal point ˆ xi that
virtually rationalizes the voting record {(f(yj),f(zj),vi
j)}j∈M.
(ii) if the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M satisﬁes (A), then there exists a strictly concave
utility function ui : Rd0 → R with ideal point ˆ xi, that strictly rationalizes the voting
record {(f(yj),f(zj),vi
j)}j∈M.
Theorem 7 provides a new twist on the common ﬁnding of many parametric ideal
point estimation techniques that two dimensional representations are suﬃcient to capture
5Recently, Schwartz (2007), Theorem 4, working in a discrete space of alternatives, gave such a suﬃcient
condition on the voting record that guarantees violation of single-peakedness of the preferences of at least
one voter over the voting alternatives, XM.
22voting patterns as is the case in, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal’s approach to the analysis of
US Congressional roll call votes.6 According to Theorem 7, two dimensions are suﬃcient
to represent any voting record and any ideal points for all voters, while at the same time
endowing each voter with a strictly concave rationalizing utility function. Note that the
voting records may satisfy the condition that the victorious alternative becomes the status
quo in successive voting items, or any possible recurrence of voting alternatives across voting
items. In fact, the Theorem places no other restrictions on the location of the original voting
alternatives, so that if that location is not known, we may place the voting alternatives
arbitrarily in the space before Theorem 7 can be applied. As long as the original voting
record does not reveal any individual preference cycles, we can achieve this representation
while at the same time ensuring that every voting record is strictly rationalized by part
(ii) of the Theorem. Independently, Bogomolnaia and Laslier have recently shown a related
result (Bogomolnaia and Laslier (2007), Theorem 16) that any individual’s preferences over
a ﬁnite set of alternatives, X ⊂ R2, can be rationalized by (possibly discontinuous) convex
preferences in R2 if and only if X = E(X). Theorem 7 on the other hand ensures that the
rationalizing convex preferences are representable by continuous strictly concave functions
and, in addition, that the revealed preference relation is jointly rationalized with arbitrarily
prespeciﬁed ideal points.
5 Vote Prediction
In this section we turn to the question of predicting the future voting behavior of
an individual voter on the basis of past observations of that individual’s voting choices.
Theorems 2 and 3 suggest a straightforward strategy for the task. Suppose that voter
i has preferences represented by an unobserved (strictly) (quasi)concave utility function
ui : Rd → R, that the record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of past votes indicating strict preference is
available, and that voter i is faced with a decision between an alternative x ∈ Rd, and some
6But see Heckman and Snyder (1997) for diﬀerent conclusions on the dimensionality of the policy space

















Figure 5: Voter i with voting record {(yj,zj,yes)}4
j=1 must (strictly) prefer any alternative in
the gray area of Figure 5(a) over x, while x must be (strictly) preferred over every alternative
in the gray area of 5(b).
alternative x0 ∈ Rd. Then, by Theorem 2 we deduce that voter i must weakly prefer x0 over
x (ui(x0) ≥ ui(x)) if x0 belongs in the set:7
Ri(x) = {x
0 ∈ R




j=0,y0 = x,z0 = x
0,v
i
0 = yes, violates (S)}.
In particular, if ui(x) > ui(x0), instead, then the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=0 is strictly
rationalized by i’s utility function ui, which is impossible since that voting record violates
(S). An identical argument ensures that we must have ui(x) ≥ ui(x0) if x0 belongs in the set:
R
−1
i (x) = {x
0 ∈ R




j=0,y0 = x,z0 = x
0,v
i
0 = no, violates (S)}.
In fact, stronger conclusions obtain if we relax the assumption that i’s voting deci-
sions indicate strict preference, while strengthening the assumption on i’s unobserved utility
function. In particular, we now assume that i has a strictly (quasi)concave utility function
ui : Rd → R and that the record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M of past votes reveals weak preference with
each voting decision. Then, if voter i is faced with a decision between an alternative x ∈ Rd,








24and some alternative x0 ∈ Rd, it must be that ui(x0) > ui(x) if x0 belongs in the set:
Pi(x) = {x
0 ∈ R




j=0,y0 = x,z0 = x
0,v
i
0 = yes, violates (W)}.
The stronger conclusion obtains because now it suﬃces to have ui(x) ≥ ui(x0), in order for ui
to rationalize the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=0 in contradiction of Theorem 3. Analogously,
we obtain that ui(x) > ui(x0) if x0 belongs in:
P
−1
i (x) = {x
0 ∈ R




j=0,y0 = x,z0 = x
0,v
i
0 = no, violates (W)}.
Hence, our penultimate Theorem is:
Theorem 8 Assume voter i has preferences represented by a utility function ui : Rd → R.
Consider a voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M, and any x ∈ Rd.
(i) If ui is (strictly) (quasi)concave and strictly rationalizes i’s voting record, then ui(x0) ≥
ui(x) for all x0 ∈ Ri(x), and ui(x0) ≤ ui(x) for all x0 ∈ R
−1
i (x).
(ii) If ui is strictly (quasi)concave and rationalizes i’s voting record, then ui(x0) > ui(x)




j)}j∈M satisﬁes (A), then Ri(x) \ Y i
M ⊆ Pi(x) and R
−1




Figure 5 depicts the same voting record as the one depicted in Figure 3, and displays
the set of alternatives Pi(x) that must be strictly preferred over alternative x by voter i, given
that voter’s observed voting behavior. Similarly, i must strictly prefer x over all alternatives
in the set P
−1
i (x) of Figure 5. In view of part (iii) of Theorem 8, we conclude that as long
as we are willing to assume strict (quasi-)concavity of voters’ utility representations, then
the added parsimony in the interpretation of the voting record in the analysis leading to
Theorem 3 has a signiﬁcant payoﬀ when it comes to predicting future decisions of individual
voters. In particular, assuming the observed voting record does not violate (A), then the
domain of possible pairs of alternatives for which we can predict voter i’s voting decision
using Theorem 8, is only slightly meager if we assume past choices reveal weak preference
as in part (ii) versus strict preference as in part (i).
256 Multiple Choice Data
We have focused the analysis on preference revelation from binary voting choices but
our results readily generalize to arbitrary choice situations over a ﬁnite set of alternatives.
To be concrete, suppose we observe individual i make a choice xj ∈ Bj, in each of m choice
situations j = 1,...,m, where Bj ⊂ Rd is a ﬁnite budget set with |Bj| ≥ 2. Cast in that
language, a voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=1 is represented by a collection {(Bj,xj)}m
j=1 where
Bj = {yj,zj} and xj = yj if vi
j = yes or xj = zj if vi
j = no. Conversely, if we are given data
{(Bj,xj)}m
j=1 with budget sets of arbitrary ﬁnite cardinality, we can equivalently represent
the information in these data in the form of a voting record with
Pm
j=1(|Bj|−1) voting items:
for each choice instance j, we simply create |Bj| − 1 voting items (xj,z,yes), one for each
z ∈ Bj\{xj}. Given the equivalence of these representations, the rationalizability conditions
established in Theorems 2 and 3 are also necessary and suﬃcient when we consider multiple
choice data {(Bj,xj)}m
j=1 and ﬁnite budget sets.
In general, we may consider a ﬁnite set K ⊂ Rd where K = ∪m
j=1Bj. The observed
multiple choice data {(Bj,xj)}m
j=1 now deﬁne an irreﬂexive preference relation R ⊂ K × K,
such that (y,z) ∈ R if and only if there exists j = 1,...,m such that xj = y and z ∈ Bj\{xj}.
For any R0 ⊆ R, we may deﬁne the analogues of Ni
M0, Y i
M0, and XM0, respectively as
N(R
0) = {x : (y,x) ∈ R
0},
Y (R




0) ∪ Y (R
0).
Furthermore, say that the revealed preference relation R is strictly rationalized if there exists
a utility function u : Rd → R such that u(y) > u(z) for all (y,z) ∈ R, merely rationalized if
u(y) ≥ u(z), instead, and virtually rationalized if it is rationalized and the subrelation
(7) Ra = {x ∈ R : @R
0 ⊆ R such that x ∈ R
0 and N(R
0) = Y (R
0)},
is strictly rationalized. Then, we have the following restatement of Theorems 2 and 3:
26Theorem 9 Consider any irreﬂexive preference relation R ⊂ K × K, where K ⊂ Rd is a
ﬁnite set of alternatives.
(i) There exists a (strictly) (quasi)cocnave utility function u : Rd → R that strictly ratio-
nalizes R if and only if there exists a nested sequence R = R1 ⊃ R2 ⊃ ... ⊃ Rk ⊃
Rk+1 = ∅ such that N(Rt \Rt+1) = {x} ⊆ E(X(Rt)), and N(Rt \Rt+1)∩X(Rt+1) = ∅
for all t = 1,...,k.
(ii) There exists a strictly (quasi)cocnave utility function u : Rd → R that (virtually)
rationalizes R if and only if there exists a nested sequence R = R1 ⊃ R2 ⊃ ... ⊃
Rk ⊃ Rk+1 = ∅ such that N(Rt \ Rt+1) ⊆ E(X(Rt)), either N(Rt \ Rt+1) = {x} or
N(Rt \Rt+1) = N(R0
t) = Y (R0
t), R0
t ⊆ Rt \Rt+1, and N(Rt \Rt+1)∩X(Rt+1) = ∅, for
all t = 1,...,k.
In Theorem 9 we have chosen to restate the necessary and suﬃcient conditions (S0)
and (W 0), respectively, of Theorems 2 and 3, but obviously the equivalent conditions (S)
and (W) could be stated, instead. In view of Theorem 9, the applications of these conditions
on the location of ideal points and choice prediction that we developed in sections 4 and 5
can be replicated with general multiple choice data {(Bj,xj)}m
j=1.
The fact that part (ii) of Theorem 9 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the relation R to be virtually rationalized makes the Theorem applicable even outside
a revealed preference context. In particular, suppose we are given a ﬁnite, irreﬂexive, and
symmetric ‘indiﬀerence’ relation Ii ⊆ Rd × Rd and a ﬁnite, irreﬂexive, and asymmetric
‘strict’ preference relation Ri ⊆ Rd × Rd. We may then construct an irreﬂexive relation
R = Ii ∪ Ri. As long as Ri = Ra, as deﬁned in (7) for this relation R, then according to
part (ii) of Theorem 9 there exists a strictly (quasi)concave utility function that represents
the indiﬀerence and strict preference relations Ii and Ri if and only if R satisﬁes the stated
condition of the Theorem.
277 Conclusions
We have derived necessary and suﬃcient conditions in order for observed binary
voting choices to be consistent with the hypothesis that the voters making these choices
have preferences that admit concave utility representations. These conditions imply simple
testable restrictions on the location of voters’ ideal points from their voting record, and
can be used to predict individual voting behavior. If the location of voting alternatives is
unrestricted (as is assumed in prevalent political methodology techniques for the estimation
of legislators’ ideal points) then the derived conditions are vacuously satisﬁed for arbitrary
ideal points for the voters, even if we restrict the space of alternatives in one dimension.
The analysis is readily applicable to the nonparametric study of general deterministic choice
situations over ﬁnite budget sets with only convexity restrictions on individual preferences.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we prove Theorems 2 to 8 and Lemma 1. We start with two Lemmas.
Lemma 2 Consider disjoint ﬁnite sets K,K0 ⊂ Rd (K possibly empty) such that K0 ⊆
E(K ∪ K0), and a strictly concave function ui : Rd → R that represents i’s preferences over
K. If x ∼i x0 for all x,x0 ∈ K0, and x i x0 for all x ∈ K, x0 ∈ K0, then there exists another
strictly concave u0
i : Rd → R that represents i’s preferences over K ∪ K0.
Proof. Since ui is strictly concave, condition (G0) of Richter and Wong (2004) holds
for K. Consider any X ⊆ K ∪ K0, such that |X| ≤ d + 1 and X ∩ K0 6= ∅. For every
x ∈ C(X)\X, we have x / ∈ K0 since K0 ⊆ E(K ∪K0). Furthermore, there exists x0 ∈ X ∩K0
since X ∩ K0 6= ∅, and we have x i x0. Thus, (G0) holds for K ∪ K0 ensuring the existence
of the required function u0
i.
The second Lemma is:
Lemma 3 Consider a ﬁnite set X ⊂ Rd and a quasiconcave function ui : Rd → R.
28(i) There exists x ∈ E(X) that minimizes ui over C(X).
(ii) If ui is strictly quasiconcave, then argmin{ui(x) : x ∈ C(X)} ⊆ E(X).
Proof. Let the set of extreme points of X be given by E(X) = {x1,...,xe} ⊆ X, which
is nonempty by Lemma 7.76, page 301, in Aliprantis and Border, (2006). Without loss of
generality assume that x1 ∈ argmin{ui(x) : x ∈ E(X)}. Every y ∈ C(X) with y / ∈ E(X) can
be written as a non-trivial convex combination of the elements of E(X), i.e., y =
P
h∈I λhxh,
where I ⊆ {1,...,e}, λh ∈ (0,1) for all h ∈ I, and
P
h∈I λh = 1. If ui is quasiconcave we
have that
ui(y) = ui (λjxj + (1 − λj)y
0) ≥ min{ui(xj),ui(y
0)},



































,h ∈ I \ {j,l}. Repeatedly
invoking the deﬁnition of quasiconcavity as above, we obtain that
ui(y) ≥ min{ui(xh) : h ∈ I} ≥ ui(x1).
Since this is true for arbitrary y ∈ C(X) \ E(X), we conclude that x1 ∈ argmin{ui(x) :
x ∈ C(X)}. To show part (ii), note that if ui is strictly quasiconcave, then the above
arguments, using deﬁnition (4) instead of weak inequality, ensure that ui(y) > ui(x1) for all
y ∈ C(X)\E(X). Thus, we conclude that argmin{ui(x) : x ∈ C(X)} ⊆ E(X), as desired.




q). Thus, in order to show (S)⇔(S0)⇔(Sc)
⇔(Sq)⇔ (S0
c)⇔(S0
q) it suﬃces to show (S0
q)⇒(S), (S)⇒(S0), and (S0)⇒(Sc).
(S0
q)⇒(S): Let quasiconcave ui : Rd → R strictly rationalize i’s record. By Lemma 3,
part (i), there exists an alternative x ∈ E(XM0) such that ui(x) ≤ ui(y) for all y ∈ C(XM0).
29If x ∈ Y i
M0 then, since ui strictly rationalizes i’s record, there exists x0 ∈ XM0 such that
ui(x) > ui(x0), a contradiction. Thus, x / ∈ Y i
M0, as we wished to show.
(S)⇒(S0): We have (S)⇒(W), so (S)⇒(W 0) by Theorem 3. We also have (S)⇒(A),
so that (S)⇒[(W 0) and (A)]⇒(S0).
(S0)⇒(Sc): We will ﬁrst show that (S0)⇒(A). Suppose not to get a contradiction,
i.e., suppose (S0) holds and there exists nonempty M0 ⊆ M such that Ni
M0 = Y i
M0. By
(S0) we have that Ni
M = {x1,...,xt,...,xk} where xt is such that {xt} = Ni
Mt\Mt+1. Let
t0 = min{t : xt ∈ Ni
M0}, so that we have M0 ⊆ Mt0. By (S0) we have xt0 / ∈ XMt0+1.
Furthermore, xt0 / ∈ Y i
{j} for all j ∈ Ni
Mt0\Mt0+1, since yh 6= zh for all h ∈ M. We conclude that
xt0 / ∈ YMt0 ⇒ xt0 / ∈ Y i
M0 = Ni
M0, a contradiction. Now we have (S0)⇒[(A) and (W 0)]⇒[(A)
and (W 0
c)] by Theorem 3. But, [(A) and (W 0
c)]⇒(Sc) since we have M = Ma deﬁned in (5),
when (A) is true.
We have established the equivalence (S) ⇔ (S0) ⇔ (Sc) ⇔ (Sq) ⇔ (S0
c) ⇔ (S0
q). Since
(S) ⇒ (S1), it remains to show:
[d = 1 and (S1)] ⇒ (S): Assume d = 1 and (S1) holds, and suppose (S) fails, in order
to get a contradiction. Then there exists M0 ⊆ M with |M0| > 2 for which E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0.
Since d = 1 and |XM0| ≥ 2, we have E(XM0) = {x,x0} for some distinct x,x0 ∈ Y i
M0. Let
x ∈ Y i
{j}, and x0 ∈ Y i
{h}. Then, E(X{j,h}) = Y i
{j,h} which contradicts our assumption that
condition (S1) holds.
Proof of Theorem 3
Since (W 0
c)⇒(Wc)⇒(Wq), and (W 0
c)⇒(W 0
q)⇒(Wq), in order to show (W)⇔(W 0)⇔(W 0
c)
⇔(W 0
q)⇔(Wc)⇔(Wq), we will show (Wq)⇒(W), (W)⇒(W 0), and (W 0)⇒(W 0
c).
(Wq)⇒(W): Let ui be a strictly quasiconcave function that rationalizes i’s voting
record. Consider any M0 ⊆ M. If there does not exist x ∈ E(XM0) such that x / ∈ Y i
M0,
then E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0. Furthermore, by part (ii) of Lemma 3 we have argmin{ui(x) : x ∈
C(XM0)} ⊆ E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0. We shall now show that there exists non-empty M00 ⊆ M0 such
30that Y i
M00 = Ni
M00 ⊆ E(XM0) and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅. Set K = argmin{ui(x) : x ∈ C(XM0)}
and deﬁne




Since K ⊆ Y i
M0, we must have Y i
Mm = K and Mm is non-empty. We also claim that we must
have Ni
Mm ⊆ Y i
Mm. If not, then there exists x ∈ Ni
Mm such that x ∈ XM0 \ K. But then
ui(x) > ui(y), for all y ∈ Y i
Mm = K, contradicting the assumption that ui rationalizes i’s
voting record. We thus indeed have Ni
Mm ⊆ Y i
Mm = K. We now inductively deﬁne a nested
sequence of nonempty subsets of Mm by setting M0
m = Mm, and
M
t+1
















m for all t and, since Mm is ﬁnite, there exists
integer k such that Mk−1
m = Mk
m = M00 6= ∅.8 We thus have Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 ⊆ E(X∗). It
remains to show that Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅. If not, then there exists j ∈ M0 \ M00 such
that Y i
{j} ⊆ Y i
M00 = Ni





m for all t. Thus, it must be that j ∈ M0 \ Mm, but this is impossible
since Y i
{j} ∩K = ∅ by the deﬁnition of Mm, a contradiction proving that Y i
M00 ∩Y i
M0\M00 = ∅.
(W)⇒(W 0): We have M1 = M, and we will successively deﬁne M2, M3, etc., up to
Mk+1. In order to determine Mt+1 at the (t+1)-th step when Mt has been deﬁned, note that
by (W) either there exists xt ∈ E(XMt) such that xt / ∈ Y i
Mt, or (if such xt does not exist) there
exists M00 ⊆ Mt such that Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 ⊆ E(XMt) and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
Mt\M00 = ∅. Let Mt+1 = {j ∈
Mt : Ni
{j} 6= {xt}} in the former case, or Mt+1 = {j ∈ Mt : Ni
{j} ∩ Ni
M00 = ∅}, in the latter
case. Obviously, Ni
Mt\Mt+1 ∩ Ni
Mt+1 = ∅ in either case. In addition, Ni
Mt\Mt+1 ∩ Y i
Mt+1 = ∅,
since either Ni
Mt\Mt+1 = {xt} and xt / ∈ Y i
Mt ⊇ Y i
Mt+1, or because Ni
Mt\Mt+1 = Ni




Mt\M00 = ∅ by (W), and Y i
Mt+1 ⊆ Y i
Mt\M00. As a result, Ni
Mt\Mt+1 ∩XMt+1 = ∅, in both
cases. Furthermore, the set M0
t required by (W 0) is given by M0
t = M00 ⊆ Mt \ Mt+1 and
8Indeed, M00 is the greatest ﬁxed point of the function T : 2Mm → 2Mm deﬁned as T(A) = {j ∈ A :
Y i
{j} ⊆ Ni
A}. Such a ﬁxed point exists by the Knaster-Tarski ﬁxed point Theorem, since 2Mm is a complete
lattice ordered by set inclusion, and T is monotone.
31Ni
Mt\Mt+1 = Y i
M0
t. Proceeding as above, we obtain a sequence M1,...,Mk+1 at the (k + 1)-th
step when Mk+1 = ∅. Thus we must have k ≤ |Ni
M| and the sequence satisﬁes (W 0).
(W 0)⇒(W 0
c): We use induction, ﬁrst establishing the existence of the required function
for the record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈Mk. Consider any strictly concave function ui : Rd → R. From
(W 0), we have Ni
Mk ⊆ E(XMk), so now Lemma 2 (applied on K = XMk \ Ni
Mk, K0 = Ni
Mk)
ensures the existence of a strictly concave uk
i that strictly rationalizes the voting record
{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈Mk if |Ni
Mk| = 1, and virtually rationalizes this record if |Ni
Mk| > 1, since
we have uk(x) > uk(x0) for all x ∈ XMk \ Ni
Mk = Y i
Mk\M0




there exists such a strictly concave function ut
i : Rd → R that virtually rationalizes the record
{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈Mt, t > 1,t ≤ k. We wish to show that there also exists such a function ut−1 for
the record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈Mt−1. By (W 0) we have Ni
Mt−1\Mt ⊆ E(XMt−1) and Ni
Mt−1\Mt∩XMt =
∅. Set K = XMt−1 \ Ni
Mt−1\Mt and K0 = Ni
Mt−1\Mt. Assuming that x i x0 for all x ∈ K,
x0 ∈ K0 then, since K0 ⊆ E(K∪K0), by Lemma 2 there exists a strictly concave u
t−1
















i (x) > u
t−1
i (x





i (x) = u
t−1
i (x
0), for all x,x
0 ∈ K
0.
Thus, ut−1 virtually rationalizes the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈Mt−1, since it imputes indif-







To complete the proof, we need to show [d = 1 and (W1)]⇒(W). In particular, we
already have (W)⇒ (W1): if (W) holds and E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0 for some |M0| = 2, we must
have Ni
M0 = Y i
M0, since Ni
{j} 6= Y i
{j} for all j ∈ M. Thus, to show that (W)⇔(W1) when
d = 1, consider arbitrary M0 ⊆ M with |M0| > 2. If there does not exist x ∈ E(XM0)
such that x / ∈ Y i
M0, then E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0 and we need to show that there exists non-empty
M00 ⊆ M0 such that Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 ⊆ E(XM00) and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅. Since E(XM0) ⊆ Y i
M0,
we have E(XM0) = {xL,xR} for some xL,xR ∈ Y i
M0. Let M00 ⊆ M0 be the largest subset
of M0 such that Y i
M00 = {xL,xR}, so that Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅. It suﬃces to show that
32Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 = {xL,xR}. First, it cannot be that Ni
M00 = {x} ⊆ {xL,xR} as in that case
yj = zj for some voting item j ∈ M00 which is impossible. Thus, the proof is complete if we
can show that there does not exist x ∈ Ni
M00 such that x / ∈ {xL,xR}. Suppose otherwise to
get a contradiction. Without loss of generality, let x ∈ Ni
{j}, xL ∈ Y i
{j}, and xR ∈ Y i
{h}. Then
we have both E(X{j,h}) ⊆ Y i
{j,h} and Y i
{j,h} 6= Ni
{j,h} contradicting the assumption that (W1)
holds.
Proof of Lemma 1
For unknowns uz


















T(z − y) > 0, for all z ∈ K, all y ∈ K, y 6= z.
Since preferences over K can be represented by strictly concave ui, there exists a solution
to this system (by setting uz
i = ui (z), and dz equal to a supergradient of ui at z). If we set
dˆ x = 0, uˆ x
i = ui(ˆ x) + η for small enough η > 0, and maintain the remaining values of the






















T(z − y) > 0, for all z ∈ K, all y ∈ K, y 6= z.
This solution to the latter system produces a strictly concave utility function ˜ ui : Rd → R
(as in Richter and Matzkin, 1991, or Richter and Wong (2004)) deﬁned as











which, for small enough ε > 0, represents i’s preferences over K \ {ˆ x} with ideal point ˆ x.
33Proof of Theorem 4
We have (b S0
q)⇒[{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (S0
q)]⇔(b S0), the latter equivalence by The-




q), we conclude (b S0)⇔(b Sc)⇔(b Sq)⇔(b S0
c)⇔(b S0
q)⇔(b S0). Since (b S0)⇒(b S), it re-
mains to show (b S)⇒(b S0), which follows from cases 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 5.
Cases 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 5 applied on subsets M0 ⊆ M ∪ ˆ M with
|M0| = 2 also prove that (b S1)⇒[{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (S1)]. Thus, if d = 1, (S1)⇔(S)
by Theorem 2, hence (b S1)⇒(b S), since we have shown (S)⇔(b S) when d = 1. Thus, we have
shown that if d = 1, (b S1)⇔(b S).
Proof of Theorem 5
We have (c Wq)⇒[{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (Wq)]⇔(c W 0), the latter by Theorem 3.
Furthermore, by Lemma 1, we also have (c W 0)⇒(c Wc). Thus, (c W 0)⇔(c Wc)⇔(c Wq). Since
(c W 0)⇒(c W), it remains to show (c W)⇒(c W 0), i.e., our goal is to show that {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M
satisﬁes condition (W) when (c W) holds. Consider any M0 ⊆ M ∪ ˆ M and distinguish three
possibilities:
Case 1, M0 ⊆ ˆ M: Then Y i
M0 = {ˆ xi} and ˆ xi / ∈ Ni
M0 so that there exists x ∈ E(XM0)
such that x / ∈ Y i
M0.
Case 2, M0∩M 6= ∅, and there exists x ∈ E(XM0∩M∪{ˆ xi}) such that x / ∈ Y i
M0∩M∪{ˆ xi}:
Since x 6= ˆ xi, we must have x ∈ XM0∩M \C(Y i
M0∩M ∪{ˆ xi}). We also have XM0 ⊇ XM0∩M and
Y i
M0 ⊆ Y i
M0∩M ∪{ˆ xi}, since Y i
{j} = {ˆ xi} for all j ∈ M0 \M. Hence we have x ∈ XM0 \C(Y i
M0).
We conclude that there exists x0 ∈ E(XM0) such that x0 / ∈ Y i
M0.
Case 3, M0 ∩ M 6= ∅, and there exists non-empty M00 ⊆ M0 ∩ M such that Y i
M00 =
Ni
M00 ⊆ E(XM0∩M ∪ {ˆ xi}), and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
(M0∩M)\M00 = ∅: We distinguish two subcases. First,
if Ni
M0\M \ C(XM0∩M ∪ {ˆ xi}) 6= ∅ then, since Y i
M0\M = {ˆ xi} given that M0 \ M 6= ∅, there
exists x ∈ E(XM0) ∩ Ni
M0\M such that x / ∈ Y i
M0. Second, if Ni
M0\M ⊂ C(XM0∩M ∪ {ˆ xi}),
then E(XM0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) = E(XM0∩M ∪ {ˆ xi}). Note that we must have ˆ xi / ∈ Ni
M00, otherwise
Ni
{j} = {ˆ xi} for some j ∈ M00 ⊆ M for which Y i
{j} 6= Ni
{j} and E(X{j} ∪ {ˆ xi}) = Y i
{j} ∪ {ˆ xi}
34violating condition (c W). Thus, we conclude that for M00 ⊆ M0 we have Y i
M00 = Ni
M00 ⊆
E(XM0∩M∪{ˆ xi})\{ˆ xi} ⊆ E(XM0). Furthermore, since ˆ xi / ∈ Y i
M00, Y i
M0\M00 ⊆ Y i
(M0∩M)\M00∪{ˆ xi}
and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
(M0∩M)\M00 = ∅, we conclude that Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅.
In sum, in all three cases, either there exists x ∈ E(XM0) such that x / ∈ Y i
M0, or there
exists non-empty M00 ⊆ M0 such that Y i
M00 = Ni
M00 ⊆ E(XM0) and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅, i.e.,
condition (W) is satisﬁed for the augmented voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M as we wished
to show.
We also conclude from cases 1 to 3 above applied to subsets M0 ⊆ M ∪ ˆ M with
|M0| = 2 that (c W1)⇒[{(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M∪ ˆ M satisﬁes (W1)]. Thus, if d = 1, (W1)⇔(W) by
Theorem 3, hence (c W1)⇒(c W), since we have shown (W)⇔(c W).
Proof of Theorem 6
Assume d = 1. Without loss of generality, let ˆ x1 ≤ ˆ x2 ≤ ... ≤ ˆ xn and (by swapping
alternatives yj, zj if necessary) let v1
j = yes for all j ∈ M. The proof is by construction.
If ˆ x1 < ˆ x2, position alternatives y1,...,ym in the interval [ˆ x1, ˆ x2), so that ˆ x1 ≤ y1 < ... <
ym < ˆ x2, otherwise set y1 < ... < ym < ˆ x1. Position alternatives z1,...,zm in (ˆ xn,+∞) so
that ˆ xn < zm < ... < z1. Now, for every pair of voting items h,j ∈ M, and for every voter
i, Ni
{j} ∩ (Y i
{j,h} ∪ {ˆ xi}) = ∅. Furthermore, if h > j, we have yj < yh < zh < zj. Thus,
for every voter i and for every h,j ∈ M, x ∈ Ni
{j} (where x = zj in the case of voter 1)
is such that x ∈ E(X{j} ∪ {ˆ xi}) and x / ∈ Y i
{j} ∪ {ˆ xi}, and, if h > j, x ∈ E(X{j,h} ∪ {ˆ xi})
and x / ∈ Y i
{j,h} ∪ {ˆ xi}. We conclude that condition (b S1) is satisﬁed and, by Theorem 4, for
every voter i the voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M is rationalizable by a strictly concave utility
function ui with ideal point ˆ xi.
To see that the Theorem also obtains in d0 > 1 dimensions, note that the constructed
voting records, {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M, in d = 1 dimension are strictly rationalizable satisfying (N).
Then, by part (ii) of Theorem 7, for every ideal points ˆ xi ∈ Rd0, i ∈ N, d0 > 1, there exist
voting alternatives y0
j,z0




strictly rationalizable by a strictly concave utility function ui with ideal point ˆ xi.
35Proof of Theorem 7
Let ˆ X = {ˆ x1,..., ˆ xn} and construct a ﬁnite set X0
M ⊂ Rd0 such that |X0
M| = |XM| and
X0
M = E(X0
M ∪ ˆ X). Since d0 > 1, such an X0
M trivially exists. Consider any onto function
f : XM → X0
M, and for every M0 ⊆ M, denote the image of XM0 under f by X0
M0 = f(XM0).
Fix arbitrary voter i, and consider the voting record {f(yj),f(zj),vi
j}j∈M. We shall show:
Claim: If E(X0
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) ⊆ Y i
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi} for some non-empty M0 ⊆ M, then there exists
non-empty M00 ⊆ M0 such that Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 ⊆ E(X0
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) and Y i




M ∪ ˆ X), we have X0
M0 ⊆ E(X0
M0 ∪ {ˆ xi}) and X0
M0 ∩ {ˆ xi} = ∅ for all
voters i. Thus, we have Ni
M0 ⊆ Y i
M0. As in the proof that (Wq)⇒(W) for Theorem 3,
inductively deﬁne a nested sequence of nonempty subsets of M0 by setting M0
0 = M0, and
M0
t+1 = {j ∈ M0
t : Y i
{j} ⊆ Ni
M0
t}. We analogously conclude that there exists integer k such
that M0
k−1 = M0
k = M00 6= ∅. Furthermore, Ni
M00 = Y i
M00 and Y i
M00 ∩ Y i
M0\M00 = ∅, the latter
because otherwise there exists j ∈ M0\M00 such that Y i
{j} ⊆ Y i
M00 = Ni
M00, which is impossible
by the deﬁnition of the sequence {M0
t}.
From the Claim we conclude that the voting record {(f(yj),f(zj),vi
j)}j∈M satisﬁes
(c W). Since the Claim obtains for every voter i, the conclusion in part (i) follows by Theorem
5. Under the additional assumption of part (ii), the voting record {(f(yj),f(zj),vi
j)}j∈M
satisﬁes (A), since the original record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M does and f is one to one. Thus, since
the voting record {(f(yj),f(zj),vi
j)}j∈M satisﬁes (c W) and (A), it also satisﬁes (b S), and part
(ii) now follows from Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 8
We have already shown parts (i) and (ii), so it remains to show part (iii). By Corol-
lary 1, a voting record {(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=0, with y0 = x violates (W) if it violates (S) and
{(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=0 satisﬁes (A). But, since {(yj,zj,vi
j)}j∈M satisﬁes (A), {(yj,zj,vi
j)}m
j=0 must
satisfy (A) if vi
0 = yes and z0 / ∈ Y i
M, or if vi
0 = no and z0 / ∈ Ni
M.
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